Week 12
Mainstream Radicalization
and the Global Far Right
SOCI 229
Response Memo Deadline
Your eigth response memo—which has to be between 250-400 words and posted on our Moodle Discussion Board—is due by 8:00 PM on Wednesday.
Final Paper Proposal Deadline
Your final paper proposals are due by 8:00 PM on Friday, November 22nd.
Guidelines for the final paper proposal can be found here.
To submit your final paper proposal, click here.
Dr. Miloš Broćić will be joining us on December 11th.
Why do we need to theorize
the radicalization of mainstream parties?
Consider the times.
The far right entered a fourth wave in the twenty-first century, electorally and politically profiting from three “crises”: the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (and beyond), the Great Recession of 2008, and the “refugee crisis” of 2015. All the western democracies were affected, albeit in different ways, shaking the national and international political status quo, and giving rise to an unprecedented wave of Islamophobic and populist protest.
(Mudde 2019, 20, EMPHASIS ADDED)
What characterizes the fourth wave, and differentiates it from the third wave, is the mainstreaming of the far right. While far-right politics was largely considered out of bounds for mainstream parties and politicians after 1945, with some notable exceptions … this is no longer the case today. In more and more countries, populist radical right parties and politicians are considered koalitionsfähig (acceptable for coalitions) by mainstream right, and sometimes even left, parties. Moreover, populist radical right (and even some extreme right) ideas are openly debated in mainstream circles, while populist radical right policies are adopted, albeit it generally in (slightly) more moderate form, by mainstream parties.
(Mudde 2019, 20–21, EMPHASIS ADDED)
Another characteristic of the fourth wave is the heterogeneity of the far right, even within the subgroup of successful political parties. While the usual suspects still constitute the core - that is, the populist radical right parties that emerge from outside the political mainstream - they are complemented by a dizzying array of new far-right parties. The most important are transformed conservative parties, such as the Alliance of Young Democrats-Hungarian Civic Alliance (Fidesz) and Law and Justice (PiS) in Poland.
(Mudde 2019, 21, EMPHASIS ADDED)
… or America’s Grand Old Party?
Absent major political realignments, a party’s mainstream or radical bona fides are often treated as essential (i.e., time-invariant) traits that are set in stone—even as mainstream parties inch rightwards and radical parties anchor governing coalitions.
Nominalist treatments of party politics
are part of a deeper problem.
[T]he categories social scientists use in our research belie the inherent fuzziness and vagueness of our most commonly used and important concepts. In many, if not most, cases, no particular feature is a common element in defining a concept. Rather, there are only family resemblances—criss-crossing patterns of similarities between different members.
(Monk 2022, 9, EMPHASIS ADDED)
[C]onsider the immense heterogeneity of features possessed by members of the category “bird” … A prototypical bird, for instance, may be of a certain size (relatively small), have feathers and a beak, be able to fly and lay eggs, and so on. These features, in turn, are weighted in terms of importance to the prototype. Clusters of key categorical cues and the relations between these cues are known as prototypes—abstract summary representations of “best examples” of a concept … Flight, for instance, may be weighted more heavily than feathers. Even the relations between features may be weighted. Having feathers and a beak may be more important than a potential bird’s size and its ability to lay eggs. These features, the sets of properties we associate with a term, are called intensions and form the foundation of human thought.
(Monk 2022, 9, EMPHASIS ADDED)
My contention: we can think of party politics through this lens, too—and focus on far right typicality in lieu of nominal
membership in the far right party family.
[S]everal scholars have turned their attention to the … question of the effect of radical right success on the behavior of other parties. The main focus in this line of research lies on the potentially ‘contagious’ effect of radical right parties, i.e. the question if their success causes other parties to adopt more anti-immigrant and culturally protectionist positions.
(Abou-Chadi and Krause 2020, 830, EMPHASIS ADDED)
If … (radical right) parties gain representation in parliament we observe a strong move towards an anti-immigrant stance by other political parties. These findings have important implications … First, they show that the radical right as an actor plays a fundamental role in the politicization of the immigration issue — they do not simply constitute a symptom of a larger development. Second, they demonstrate that the transformation of the political space in Western Europe … is not simply a reaction to shifting preferences of the European electorate, but is a result of the strategic interaction of political parties. Third, in relation to a more general literature on party competition they underline that parties do not only follow shifts on the demand side of the electoral market, but react to other parties’ behavior.
(Abou-Chadi and Krause 2020, 843–44, EMPHASIS ADDED)
To wit, far right parties are not simply outgrowths of sociocultural cleavages in greater society—they can create fault-lines themselves and restructure the topography of the political field (cf. Eidlin 2016).
How does the mainstream European right respond?
Figure 3.7 from Abou-Chadi and Krause (2021).
Although anti-immigrant shifts constitute a ‘double-edged sword’ for the mainstream right as they run into the danger of making the views of the far right socially acceptable … they tend to tighten policy proposals in order to remedy electoral losses to the radical right and win back vote switchers.
(Abou-Chadi and Krause 2021, 86, EMPHASIS ADDED)
[W]e investigate one of the core questions within the research on radical right success: Do accommodative strategies help to weaken RRPs electorally? Our analyses do not provide any evidence that adopting more anti-immigrant positions reduces the radical right’s support. Combining macro- and micro-level evidence, we can demonstrate that this does not mean that voters are generally unresponsive to party repositioning. To the contrary, accommodative policy shifts by mainstream parties tend to catalyze voter transfers between mainstream parties and RRPs. While some of these transitions cancel out in aggregation, the radical right, if anything, seems to be the net beneficiary of this exchange.
(Krause, Cohen, and Abou-Chadi 2023, 178, EMPHASIS ADDED)
Figure 1 from Krause, Cohen and Abou-Chadi (2023).
Yes, I will once again assign you to groups.
In your assigned group, discuss if you believe the Republican Party is radicalizing—and what that means in the American context.
In developing your argument(s), refer to Golder’s (2016) treatment of political opportunity structures, Mudde’s (2007) minimum and maximum definitions of the far right party family, and today’s discussion of far right typicality.
Once we reconvene, you will be expected to ask your classmates questions.
Note: Scroll to access the entire bibliography